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Abstract 
This article analyses, without any attempt to be exhaustive, the legal impact 
that different measures taken to deal with the economic and financial crisis 
through legislation meant for urgent circumstances has had on some social 
rights. In this sense, we specifically focus on the effect of such measures in 
relation to labour rights, the right to housing and some social benefits. 
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1. Introduction 
The world economic and financial crisis, which has affected Europe particularly 
intensely in the states within the Eurozone, has unleashed an entire series of 
institutional reactions to deal with it. These reactions have been constitutionally 
and legally significant and have had major effects on the regulation of rights in 
the social, cultural and economic spheres. The constitutional reforms carried 
out in Germany, Spain and Italy to include the principle of the stability of public 
finances into the supreme law of the land, known as the golden rule on 
budgetary matters, reveal the scope of the crisis’ impact on the foundations of 
the rule of law, especially the division of powers. It also questions the juridical 
impact that the legal measures taken to outline and execute this rule may have 
on the guarantee of the rights that are the most deeply rooted on the 
underpinnings of the social state. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse, without any attempt to be 
exhaustive, this legal impact on some of the social rights that are part of what is 
called the welfare state. With this purpose in mind, in addition to offering a 
summary and descriptive outline of the causes that may explain the serious 
crisis underway, in the first section we shall analyse the consequences of the 
repeated use of the legal institution of the decree-law on power relations. We 
shall then examine the effects that the labour reform has had on the particularly 
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significant social rights such as labour rights (art. 35.1 of the Spanish 
Constitution [SC]; art. 25 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia [SAC]) and 
collective bargaining (art. 37.1 SC). We will continue with an analysis of the 
measures that lawmakers have taken in some autonomous communities (ACs), 
such as in the 2007 case involving Catalonia at the start of the crisis, and more 
recently Andalusia, to guarantee the right to decent housing (art. 47 SC; 26 and 
47 SAC, art. 56.1 Statute of Autonomy of Andalusia [SAA]). Finally, we shall 
mention the recent Constitutional Court Ruling (CCR) 61/2013 dated 14 March 
2013 on calculating the vesting periods in part-time work contracts, in which 
the Court declared the system used to calculate vesting periods in part-time 
contracts when requesting a contributory pension unconstitutional and null and 
void. 
 
2. The background of the crisis and the legal responses: The reform 
of article 135 SC 
A) The economic and financial crisis that emerged in the middle of the past 
decade originated in the failure of the real estate sector in the United States in 
2007 (Ruiz-Huerta, 2012: 147 and forward). According to the senior European 
Union politicians, the public debt crisis was the cause of the financial crisis, and 
in particular the crisis in credit entities in the EU. However, this is a story that 
contrasts considerably with what is claimed by economists who are more critical 
of the causes behind the crisis. They claim that the explanation is precisely the 
opposite: the international financial situation is what caused the public debt 
crisis, not vice-versa. Additionally, we should add the grave situation of public 
finances compared to public spending and the revenues of the public 
administrations in the states within the Eurozone, which had promoted a policy 
of low fiscal pressure. In the specific case of the Spanish economy, we must also 
bear in mind the structural problems that have aggravated the situation, namely 
structural unemployment, low productivity, excessive dependence on a given 
economic sector or sub-sector, difficulty creating companies and a high level of 
decentralisation of revenues and spending, which were not accompanied state-
wide by suitable coordination mechanisms among the different levels of public 
administration involved (Ruiz Almendral, 2009: 113). 
The general explanation of the crisis has been crafted in the following 
terms: during the expansive economic cycle, governments drew up budgets with 
limited public deficits, although public debt was quite high. In contrast, the 
private sector, particularly in Spain, spurred by the real estate bubble, reacted 
by tending to take on much higher debt than it could handle. The banks were 
not very scrupulous when lending capital to whomever asked for it, capital that 
they did not have either but instead had to largely find abroad. That is, Spanish 
banks and savings and loans were also in debt. Therefore, the indirect or remote 
creditor of Spanish citizens has often been and still is European financial 
entities in the Eurozone (especially Germany and France). The reports 
predicting the burst of the real estate bubble led to a considerable deterioration 
in public finances, inasmuch as external private debt affected the economic 
system of the state via fiscal crisis and growth in sovereign public debt. The risk 
premium – defined as the difference between what it costs to request credit in a 
ten-year loan with respect to the German bond – has become an unavoidable 
benchmark in capturing the health of the economic systems. 
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This crisis implacably affected the stability of public finances, and the 
first major response was to incorporate the principle of stability into the 
supreme law of the land, even though this rule, called the golden rule, was 
already established in European law. The first was Germany in 2009, which 
after a long period of reflection took the decision to reform its 1949 constitution. 
It was followed by Spain (2011), which did so almost summarily, and later Italy 
followed suit (2012). Other states have included it via lower-ranking regulations 
(France). And it was particularly after the implementation of the principle of 
stability of public finances that an entire series of laws were enacted that have 
influenced and affected the purpose and scope of certain rights within the social 
and economic order. 
B) The preamble to the reform of article 135 SC dated 27 September 2011 
explicitly includes a European referent, namely the 2011 reform of the EU’s 
2007 Stability and Growth Plan (SGP), and it justifies the constitutional revision 
by “the current economic and financial situation, which is marked by a 
profound, lasting crisis”, stating that the reform’s goal is “[…] strengthening 
trust in the stability of the Spanish economy in the middle and long term”, as 
well as “[…]reinforcing Spain’s commitment to the European Union while 
guaranteeing the economic and social stability of our country”. 
The reform of article 135 introduced an important, decisive change in the 
formal and material aspects of the regulation of public finances. The 
constitutional revision was carried out quite quickly without a prior reflection 
period using an emergency parliamentary procedure in a single reading, via 
agreement between the government of President Rodríguez Zapatero (Socialist 
Workers’ Party of Spain, or PSOE in its Spanish abbreviation) and the People’s 
Party (PP), which was the opposition at that time. 
Its essential content consisted of the establishment of: 
• The principle of budgetary stability, in which all the public 
administrations (state, autonomous communities and local entities) 
have to match their actions to the principle of budgetary stability. 
• European law as the parameter of constitutionality: The state and 
the autonomous communities cannot run a structural deficit than 
exceeds the margins established by the European Union. In this 
sense, from now on the provisions contained in the Treaty 
Establishing the European Stability Mechanism issued in Brussels on 
2 February 2012 and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance of the European Economic and Monetary Union signed in 
Brussels on 2 March 2012 must be borne in mind. The limits to the 
structural deficit shall be applicable after 2020 (single additional 
provision). 
• Parliamentary delegation to set the deficit limits. An organic law will 
set the maximum structural deficit allowed by the state and the 
autonomous communities in relation to the gross national product. 
The local entities must show balanced budgets. This law had to be 
approved by 30 June 2012 (single additional provision, paragraph 1). 
According to this constitutional mandate, the law was approved 
before the deadline: specifically, Organic Law 2/2012 dated 27 April 
2012 on budgetary stability and financial sustainability, approved 
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under the mandate of the government of President Rajoy (PP), which 
was formed after the legislative elections held on 20 November 2011. 
• Legal reservation for the issuance of conditional public debt. The 
state and the autonomous communities must be authorised by law to 
issue public debt or take on credit. The conditions are the following: 
o Credits to pay the interest and capital of public debt of the 
administration shall always be understood as included as 
expenditures from their budgets, and paying them shall be an 
absolute priority. 
o Credits may not be subjected to amendment or modification as 
long as they match the conditions on the issuance law. 
o The public debt of all the public administrations may not exceed 
the reference value established in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.   
• The exception to the limits on deficit and debt. These limits may only 
be exceeded under the following circumstances: natural catastrophes, 
economic recession or extraordinary emergency situations which are 
beyond the control of the state and considerably harm the financial 
situation or economic or social sustainability of the state. These 
circumstances must be agreed upon by the absolute majority of the 
Congress of Deputies. 
• The content of the organic law. The law must regulate: 
o The distribution of the limits to the deficit and debt among the 
different public administrations, the exceptional circumstances in 
which the deficit may be exceeded, and the manner and timeframe 
for correcting any deviations which might arise. 
o The methodology and calculation of the structural deficit. 
o Each administration’s responsibility in the event that the 
budgetary stability objectives are not met.  
• The principle of budgetary stability obligates the autonomous 
communities. The infra-state political entities, in line with their 
statutes of autonomy, must adapt their own provisions to those 
contained in article 135 SC. Thus, for example, Catalonia (Law 6/2012 
dated 17 May 2012), Galicia (Law 6/2012, dated 17 May 2012) and 
Aragón (Law 5/2012, dated 7 June 2012) now have their own laws on 
budgetary stability. 
The reform of article 135 SC necessitates a commentary which must cover 
three aspects of special interest: a) the background and theoretical 
underpinning of the constitutionalisation of the rules on balancing the public 
finances; b) the position of European law in relation to establishing the 
principle of budget stability in the Constitution; and c) the procedure of revising 
the Constitution and the content of article 135 SC.1 
                                                 
1 Regarding the reform of article 135 SC, see the Revista Española de Derecho Constitucional 
no. 93, September-December 2011, which gathered the opinions of a group of constitutionalists 
The impact of the crisis on social rights  CSSR, 6 (2016)      29 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
a’) Precedents in comparative law on the incorporation of the limit on 
public deficit into constitutions are hard to find, because it is certainly not 
common for a constitutional text to contain rules of this nature. The most 
significant similar case is the reference to the public debt contained in the 14th 
Amendment, section 4, of the Constitution of the United States (dated 9 July 
1868): “The validity of public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned [...].” It is also 
common to invoke the case of article 14 of the French Constitution from the 
Second Republic in 1848, which considers all kinds of obligations contracted by 
the state from creditors as inviolable, or even the law dated 10 August 1926, 
approved during the Third French Republic, which amended its constitutional 
laws by stating that “the amortisation of the public debt is constitutional in 
nature”. 
In any event, the incorporation of balanced budgets into the Constitution 
seems like a very rigid choice. There is clearly no doubt that sound stewardship 
of public accounts should lead to a reasonable balance between income and 
expenditures during the budgetary period. And in this sense, the stability of the 
public finances should be a goal of the state’s economic policies, in line with its 
own economic capacity. However, budgetary instability does not exclude the 
possibility of running a deficit, whereas the notion of budgetary balance seems 
to shut down the state’s ability to become indebted, which would be 
contradictory to the objectives of the social and democratic rule of law. 
From a legal standpoint, the constitutional reform in Spain, which 
incorporated the principle of budgetary stability, does not seem absolutely 
necessary. The external reasons from the European Union are a different 
matter, which may explain a constitutional reform pushed through urgently 
during the summer of 2011. Indeed, it was unnecessary because the provisions 
on budgetary stability were already contained in European primary law (art. 126 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), and furthermore, the 
primacy of European law over national law meant that the state was already 
bound to the objective of compulsory budgetary stability for all public 
administrations. In accordance with its exclusive competence ex art. 149.1.13ª 
SC to set “[the] bases and coordination of general planning of the economic 
activity”, the state has the regulatory capacity to approve specific laws on 
budgetary stability for the general state administration, the autonomous 
communities (ACs) and the local entities. In this sense, since 2001 it had been 
legislating in this vein through Organic Law 18/2001 dated 12 December 2001, 
on General Budgetary Stability (Aznar government, PP), which was modified by 
Legislative Degree 2/2007 dated 28 December 2007 (Rodríguez Zapatero 
government, PSOE). 
In turn, through repeated jurisprudence (among others, CCR 134/2011 
dated 20 July 20110) the Constitutional Court has interpreted that in 
accordance with articles 149.1.13ª and 14a SC, the state has the competence to 
take compulsory measures that limit the budgetary capacity of the ACs and local 
corporations. Therefore, the state already had the legal capacity needed to 
                                                                                                                                               
(pp. 159-210). See, too, the issue of the journal Claves de Razón Pràctica, no. 216, October 2011, 
with the contributions of Professors Blanco Valdés and Tajadura Tejada; Bassols Coma (2012); 
Ruiz Almendral (2009); Embid Irujo (2012); Medina Guerrero (2012). 
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intervene in the economic and financial system without the need for the reform 
of art. 135 SC.  
On the other hand, this constitutional reform starts with a political and 
financial approach that reflects a given economic and financial option, although 
it does not necessarily have to be the only possible one. For this reason, it 
introduces a factor of rigidity in the matter, such as the budgetary authority of 
the Parliament, which by its very political nature requires a much more flexible 
legal instrument than the Constitution to deal with the fluctuations in the 
economic and financial situation at any given time. 
b’) The position of European law in determining the principle of 
budgetary stability in the Constitution. The reform of art. 135 of the SC was 
framed as a way to incorporate EU law into the Constitution (Rubio Llorente, 
2011: 4 and following), that is, as an opportunity to formalise the presence of the 
European legal order in Spanish law. However, as mentioned above, the legal 
authority to establish limits to the deficit and public debt was already provided 
by EU law; furthermore, the primacy of European law rendered the 
constitutional reform unnecessary (Ferreres Comella, 2012: 101-102). 
Despite this, we should point out the newness of the double reference 
made in EU law in sections two (public deficit) and three (public debt), which 
now turn European law into a parameter of constitutionality which 
constitutional judges must unquestionably bear in mind. This circumstance 
opens up a new scenario in constitutional jurisprudence, since until now the 
Constitutional Court has always declared that it is not the judge of EU law (CCR 
28/1991, Legal Underpinning [LU] 4 and 64/1991, LU 4). Inasmuch as the 
constitutional reform itself is what made EU law an integral part of the 
parameter of constitutionality, the Constitutional Court must somehow 
incorporate it into its judgement of constitutionality. 
c’) The constitutional review procedure and the content of art. 135 SC.2 
a”) The first observation which must be made on the reform procedure is 
the speed with which it was undertaken during August 2011, after the in 
extremis agreement between the two main political parties statewide, the PSOE 
and the PP, without the cooperation of the minority parties (IU-ICV, UPD, ERC, 
BNG) or the peripheral nationalist parties (PNB and CiU). This circumstance 
contrasts with the widespread consensus generated by the approval of the 1978 
Constitution, and is a poor precedent for Spain’s political life. The constitutional 
reform was undertaken under the urgent procedure with a single reading. 
Therefore, it is a reform hastily made, essentially in one month, which appeared 
in the Official National Gazette (abbreviated BOE in Spanish) dated 27 
September of that same year, and it affected an issue of particular importance, 
namely the inclusion of the golden rule in budgetary matters, without prior 
political and juridical debate. There was no debate in Parliament, nor discussion 
among the social and economic stakeholders. Nor was there a prior juridical 
debate because of the unexpected swiftness of the political decision. This 
                                                 
2 The considerations made in this section originate in the lecture (Rapport sur l’Espagne) I 
delivered at the 28th Table Ronde Internacional on Le juge constitutionnel et l’équilibre des 
finances publiques, organised by the Institut Louis Favoreu et le Group d’Études et de 
Recherches sur la Justice Constitutionnelle and held in the University of Aix-en-Provence on 14 
and 15 September 2012. 
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circumstance also contrasts with the two years that Germany required in the 
reform of its Grundgesetz in 2009.  
There were attempts to justify the summary constitutional review in the 
preamble of the reform. After mentioning the EU Stability and Growth Pact, 
which sought to prevent the appearance of an excessive budget deficit in the 
euro zone, it argued that: “[…] the current economic and financial situation, 
marked by a profound, prolonged crisis, has only reinforced the timeliness of 
carrying out the reference principle in our Constitution, with the purpose of 
strengthening trust in the stability of the Spanish economy in the middle and 
long term”.  Likewise, it adds that the purpose of the reform is “[…] to reinforce 
Spain’s commitment to the European Union while also guaranteeing the 
economic and social sustainability of our country”. The political authors of the 
reform probably had solid reasons for carrying it out in such a summary 
fashion, and surely their goal with this decision was to provide a quick response 
to the request issued to all the member states of the Eurogroup in the wake of 
the communication issued by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the President of the French Republic, and likely the European 
Central Bank as well. 
b”) The parliamentary procedure used to approve this reform was the 
special urgent procedure with a single reading (Bassols Coma, 2012: 23-29). 
According to art. 150.1 of the Regulation of the Congress of Deputies (RCD), 
“When the nature of the project or proposed law being considered advises it, or 
when the simplicity of its formulation allows it, the Plenary Session of the 
Legislature, at the proposal of the Committee, heard by the Conference of 
Presidents, may agree to directly process it in a single reading”. If the agreement 
is adopted, the debate is held in the same way, as a holistic debate (art. 150.2 
RCD), meaning that the parliamentary deliberation is carried out on the text as 
a whole, not article by article. And “if the result of the vote is favourable, the text 
shall be considered approved and shall be forwarded to the Senate [...]”. The 
single reading procedure in the Senate is similar (art. 129 Regulation of the 
Senate [RS]). 
Therefore, it is clear that the nature of the reform of the Constitution in 
terms of the importance and relevancy of the content of art. 135 SC advises 
against carrying out the debate and approval of the project presented by the 
government in such a summary procedure as single reading. After all, the 
parliamentary debate was, in fact, reduced to its minimum expression, while the 
purpose of the reform is nothing short of the incorporation of the golden rule in 
budgetary matters into the Constitution regarding both the deficit and the 
public debt. Likewise, this reform directly affects the content of the social rights 
that may be affected by the reduction in public spending, and therefore the goals 
of the social and democratic state of law. Therefore, there may be powerful 
reasons why the nature of the project did not allow for the application of the 
urgent procedure in single reading. Nor did the content of the project, which is 
anything but simple. In this sense, the second constitutional reform from 2011 
has little to do with the first one effected in 1992 when Spain joined the 
Maastricht Treaty, which consisted of the addition of the word “passive” in 
article 13.2 SC related to foreigners’ right to vote. 
There is no doubt that the choice of this procedure, which avoided debate 
on a constitutional reform of the political and legal scope of article 135 SC, did 
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not leave the minority parliamentary groups indifferent. And this was the case 
of the parliamentary group made up of the deputies from the ERC and the ICV, 
who filed an appeal against different Congress of Deputies resolutions for failure 
to admit the complaints cited against the choice of the urgent procedure in 
single reading to approve the reform. Since this as an act of legislative power, 
the appeal went directly before the Constitutional Court. The fundamental law 
invoked by the deputies was the right to political participation, and specifically 
political representatives’ right to ius in officium (art. 23.2 SC). The 
Constitutional Court majority issued an interlocutory rejecting the appeal. The 
main argument supporting their decision, in relation to the option to use the 
procedure of single reading, stated that “[…] the norms applicable (art. 150 RCD 
and similar) do not establish matters not subjected to that procedure […]”, the 
reason why the legal order did not prevent the use of this procedure. Regarding 
the request for urgent decision on the reform, the Court further underscored 
that “[…] it cannot be asserted that there were no underlying reasons for the 
request, from the time when the term of the legislature had been publicly 
announced by recourse to the calling of early elections […]” (Interlocutory dated 
13 January 2012). Two of the magistrates who disagreed with the resolution 
stated that they believed that an issue of this importance should have been 
resolved with a ruling, while a third expressed his disagreement in the sense 
that the court should have analysed whether the vote of the Congress of the 
Deputies which determined the adoption of the procedure of single reading had 
obeyed the regulatory mandate of art. 150 RCD. 
c”) The analysis of the content of the reform of art. 135 SC (Medina 
Guerrero, 2012: 131-164; Embid Irujo, 2012: 65-90) allows us to state that it is a 
highly detailed precept. Despite this, the most important aspects refer first to 
the incorporation of European law as a generic parameter of constitutionality to 
judge the limits on the structural deficit and volume of public debt taken on by 
all the public administrations as a whole (art. 135.2 SC); secondly the 
constitutional mandate which establishes that both the state and the 
autonomous communities must be authorised by law to issue public debt or 
contract credit (art. 135.3 SC); and thirdly and most importantly, the decisive 
constitutional mandate which states that credits to pay interest and capital on 
the administrations’ public debt should always be understood as included in the 
report of expenditures of their budgets, and their payment shall be an absolute 
priority (art. 135.3 SC). 
As discussed above, European law as a partial parameter of 
constitutionality in financial matters (Schelkle, 2007: 707 and forward) entails a 
new development and a challenge for constitutional jurisdiction, which until 
now had refused to judge EU law. The legal requirement on issuing public debt 
had been stipulated in the previous art. 135.1 SC for the government of the state 
before the reform, and now it extends to the ACs as well. Yet in the case of the 
ACs, the SC does not specify whether the law is supposed to be state-wide or 
regional. However, we should understand that the law can only be a state law, 
bearing in mind the state’s exclusive competence over the bases and 
coordination of the general planning of economic activity (art. 149.1.13ª SC) and 
its exclusive full competence over the General Treasury and state debt. 
Regarding this aspect, the legislation on the financing of ACs (Organic Law 
8/1980 dated 22 September 1980, abbreviated LOFCA) had already established 
that the ACs required authorisation from the state to issue debt (for a period of 
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less than one year) as long as its purpose is not to resolve treasury issues. 
Finally, the criterion of absolute priority which the constitutional reform gives 
to credits to ensure that the capital and interest of the debt are paid is of prime 
importance, since it poses a major limitation on the Parliament’s ability to 
decide on the order of expenditures which the state must deal with each year in 
the budget law. There is no doubt that in this respect, the incorporation of the 
golden rule into the Constitution is a limitation on the Parliament’s political 
autonomy to decide on essential aspects of the social state, such as expenditures 
on healthcare, education and social services. 
In turn, the preamble of Organic Law 2/2012 dated 27 April 2012 on 
budgetary stability and financial sustainability, approved by mandate of the 
constitutional reform of art. 135, repeats the same arguments as reasons for 
limiting the decision-making capacity of the General Courts on economic and 
budgetary matters: the economic crisis with a deficit of 11.2% in 2009 in all the 
public administrations, and the financial tensions in the European markets 
which revealed the EU’s institutional fragility and the need to strengthen the 
economic integration process and ensure broader fiscal and budgetary 
integration among all the EU member states. This situation requires a strong 
economic policy to be applied based on fiscal consolidation, which entails 
eliminating the structural public deficit and developing structural reforms. In 
this sense, we should highlight the fact that along with the changes carried out 
by the previous government (PSOE), the new government (PP) has undertaken 
an entire series of modifications which reform the laws related to the workplace, 
the financial system, healthcare and education. And we should also underscore 
that almost all of them were done via the legal instrument of the decree law (art. 
86 of the SC). Throughout 2012, 29 decree laws were approved, that is, a mean 
of two per month. Exceptionalism, the former hallmark of decree laws, has 
become commonplace. This circumstance emphasises the fact that the all the 
reforms underway are being carried out practically without the involvement of 
the Parliament, with the absence of debate on their content and possible 
alternatives, and that furthermore this is taking place under political 
circumstances in which the PP has an absolute majority. For this reason, it is 
not too bold to say that there are major reasons for stating that the institutional 
response to the crisis has not only lowered decision-making capacity in such a 
sensitive policy area as the Parliament’s exercise of budgetary authority, but 
even more importantly that it is weakening the solidity of the principle of the 
division of powers. 
 
3. The use and abuse of the decree law as a regulatory instrument 
A) Indeed, in its first year at the helm of the executive power, the PP 
government has repeatedly used urgent legislation: 29 decree laws to approve a 
broad set of measures without parliamentary debate, most of them related to 
the economic and financial crisis which is still besieging citizens and 
companies.3 The issues which were the target of regulation, which directly or 
indirectly affect social rights, include: reorganisation of the financial sector; the 
reform of the labour market, which was later regulated by the law of the Courts; 
                                                 
3 Until the date on which this article was concluded (9 May 2013), six decree laws had been 
approved by the government so far that year.   
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financing mechanisms to pay suppliers of local entities; protection of mortgage 
holders with no resources; the creation of a fund to finance  payments to 
suppliers; the simplification of the obligation of information and documentation 
of mergers and split-offs of capital companies; the introduction of tax and 
administrative measures aimed at lowering the public deficit; the modification 
of financial norms related to European authorities’ oversight powers; the 
rationalisation of public spending on education; environmental measures; the 
reorganisation and sale of real estate assets in the financial sector; the 
liberalisation of trade and other services; measures regarding infrastructures 
and railway services; the extension of the professional retraining programme for 
people whose unemployment benefits have run out; the reorganisation and 
resolution of credit entities which would later be approved as a law, etc. 
What is more, the recourse to urgent legislation has not been used 
exclusively by the state government. After the incorporation of this regulatory 
instrument into the new generation of autonomous community statutes, which 
started with the Statute of the Community of Valencia in 2006,4 the 
governments of different autonomous communities have also resorted to the 
expeditious route of the decree law to approve new economic and social 
regulations aimed at dealing with the effects of the economic crisis. 
This was the case, for example, of Catalonia (art. 64 SAC), where the 
decree law has frequently been used by the government of the Generalitat as 
well. For example, in late 2011, a decree law was passed to take measures on 
treasury matters, although it was repealed shortly thereafter. In 2012, the 
decree laws that were approved affected the Generalitat’s Economic Financial 
Rebalance Plan and other needs sparked by the economic and financial 
situation, most notably the measure adopted on payment of the euro for 
expediting medical prescriptions, in which the Catalan administration assesses 
the processing the prescription regardless of the payment method on the use of 
healthcare services established by the state. Another was on improvements in 
economic benefits for temporary incapacity of the staff serving the 
administration of the Generalitat in its public sector and Catalan public 
universities; another reorganised certain financial guarantees in the public 
sector and tax modifications; and yet another decree law adopted measures on 
commercial timetables and certain promotional activities. Even with the acting 
government assembled after the early elections called on 25 October 2012, a 
regulation on a new tax on credit entities was approved, which the government 
of the state immediately appealed on the grounds of unconstitutionality. 
In turn, in 2012 the government of the Balearic Islands used the 
instrument of the decree law (art. 49, Statute of Autonomy of the Balearic 
Islands [SABI]) to approve urgent measures on sustainable urban planning, 
reorganise the Health Service, reduce the public deficit and modify the system 
of commercial activity. 
The government of the Community of Valencia followed suit; over the 
course of the same year it used this regulatory instrument (art. 44 Statute of 
Autonomy of the Community of Valencia [SACV]) to take measures against the 
crisis and to promote economic activity, such as by approving urgent measures 
to lower the deficit of the Community of Valencia; supporting business initiative 
                                                 
4 Approved by Organic Law 1/2006, dated 10 April 2006. 
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and entrepreneurs, micro-companies and SMEs, which was later approved as a 
law; and regulating administrative certification bodies. It also used decree laws 
to pass measures to guarantee budgetary stability and foster competitiveness 
and to restructure and rationalise the public business and foundation sector, 
which were also later approved as laws. More recently, we should mention the 
case of Andalusia, in which the government (art. 110 SAA) approved Decree Law 
6/2013 dated 9 April 2013 on measures to ensure compliance with the social 
function of housing. 
B) This unbridled dynamic of dealing with the legal measures to counter the 
crisis makes the Constitutional Court’s doctrine on the decree law a mere 
abstraction. Even though, as a general rule, the court has been fairly flexible in 
relation to the legal judgement on each case under the assumption of the 
qualifying competence of article 86.1 SC (“in case of extraordinary and urgent 
need”) (Santolaya Machetti, 1988: 103 and forward), this does not mean that the 
jurisprudential permissiveness towards the government on the judgement of 
opportuneness legitimises the indiscriminate avalanche of decree laws on 
record. This observation is particularly applicable statewide, but that does not 
exclude its applicability to autonomous community decree laws as well, where 
we can glean that the same jurisprudential doctrine can be applied to their 
essence given their legal similarity to the figure of state regulation. 
Regarding the crux of the matter being discussed in this study, that is, the 
effects of regulation on rights in the social sphere, it is not the same if this affect 
takes place as a consequence of a parliamentary debate on a project or proposed 
law, which can be amended as part of the different political options expressed in 
the Parliament, and if it comes from a decision which is, in fact, unilateral by the 
government. After all, in the parliamentary procedure of the decree law, the 
position of the Parliament – and specifically the Congress of Deputies – 
regarding the government is in fact quite forced, and probably more similar in 
comparative terms to an administrative adhesion contract than a more 
symmetrical relationship between the parties. In any event, what becomes clear 
is that the holistic debate prior to the approval or even potential repeal of the 
decree law does not allow for detailed or particularly plural deliberation on the 
different aspects contained in the articles of the provision. The government is 
the one to push the Parliament to accept or reject the entire contents of the 
decree law ad limine. And if, as with the current legislature in the General 
Courts, the government also has an ample parliamentary majority, the debate is, 
in fact, more formal than anything else. The opposition parliamentary groups 
express their position in forcibly more general terms, and the ministry with 
authorities over the matter is usually limited to reproducing the arguments 
contained in the Statement of Motives of the decree law. 
C) The Constitutional Court’s doctrine on the existence of qualifying 
competence, based on a situation of extraordinary and urgent need, was initially 
outlined in CCR 29/1982 dated 31 May 1982 (which was later reiterated), which 
states that the bulk of this determination, with a reasonable margin of 
discretion, corresponds to the government, which is the entity that exercises the 
function of direct policymaking. This general criterion has been applied on 
social and economic matters. However, despite this general criterion which 
attributes deference to the government, the Court itself clarified that the 
qualifying assumption is not synonymous with a kind of open clause that gives 
the government an omni-modal, unrestricted margin of determination. As the 
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Council of Statutory Guarantees of the Generalitat de Catalunya has noted when 
referring to constitutional jurisprudence, this interpretation of article 86.1 SC 
means that “[…] in spite of the government’s determination, because of its 
factual nature it is a decision that befalls the bodies which have the political 
direction; the Constitutional Court, as stated in CCR 29/1982 dated 31 May 
1982, is not disempowered to control the actions of these political bodies. That 
is, that the political nature of the decision ‘[…] cannot be an obstacle to 
extending the examination of the qualifying competence to the knowledge of the 
CC or whenever needed to ensure the use of the decree-law in line with the 
Constitution’ (LU 3)”.5 
The rule of deference regarding the political nature of the government’s 
decision seems to have undergone a substantial change or even a kind of turning 
point in CCR 68/2007 dated 28 March 2007, which declares unconstitutional 
Royal Decree Law 5/2002 dated 24 May 2002 on urgent measures for the 
reform on the protection of unemployment and the improvement of 
employability. Specifically, it deemed that the government provided no 
justification that would allow it to determine the existence of the assumption of 
qualifying competence, per art. 86.1 SC.6 In theory, this ruling signalled a 
change in criterion in the sense that it required the government, via the report 
that should accompany the development of the draft provision within the 
government stating the motives and the parliamentary debate approving it, to 
make a greater argumentative effort to justify its competence to act 
extraordinarily and urgently with regard to a specific situation. However, this 
more restrictive canon does not seem to have convinced the Executive to change 
the broad and instrumental conception of the assumption of qualifying 
competence of the decree law as it had been applying, regardless of the political 
stripe of the governments and parliamentary majorities which had supported 
them. In the slew of decree laws approved in late 2012, we can find several 
examples that also sparked a consultative opinion on unconstitutionality from 
the Council of Statutory Guarantees because of the lack of justification of the 
situation of extraordinary and urgent need. Its arguments are particularly 
interesting for the purposes of this paper. 
This is the case, for example, of Royal Decree Law 16/2012 dated 20 April 
2012 on urgent measures to guarantee the sustainability of the National Health 
System and to improve the quality and safety of its services, whose content 
directly affects the right to healthcare. Even though the state government 
deemed that the requirements stipulated by article 86.1 SC were indeed in place, 
in its Opinion 6/2012 dated 1 June 2012, the Council stated that “[…] from the 
text of the Decree Law, one can glean that implementation of the main elements 
of the new healthcare system will take more than four months (first transitory 
provision) and therefore these are measures that ‘do not instantaneously modify 
the existing legal status’ (CCR 29/1982, LU 3, and 1/2012, LU 11). In this regard, 
we could argue in favour of the government’s thesis that the aforementioned 
                                                 
5 Council of Statutory Guarantees ruling no. 7/2010, LU 3. 
6 However, we should not downplay the fact that when STC 68/2007 was approved, Royal 
Decree Law 5/2002, passed by the Aznar government (months later it would be enacted as law), 
whose content was the subject of an appeal over unconstitutionality, had already been repealed 
by Decree Law 5/2006, approved by the Rodríguez-Zapatero government, which reinstated 
procedural salaries in dismissal processes which the former had eliminated. 
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timeframe is necessary in order to implement the system, but this is not 
justified in the preamble to the royal decree law, which only contains a general 
reference to the need to use a regulatory instrument with immediate effects 
because the measures that seek to guarantee the sustainability of the system will 
be applied as urgently as possible. This omission is even more glaring when we 
examine the transcription of the approval debate, in which no reference is made 
to this issue” (LU 2). Therefore, the Council deemed that the requirement of 
urgency was not justified. 
Its opinion on another case was quite similar in that it also denied that 
the same requirement was justified in such a core matter as the fundamental 
right to education, which was affected by Royal Decree Law 14/2012 dated 20 
April 2012 on urgent measures to rationalise public spending on education 
(Opinion 7/2012, dated 8 June; LU 3).   
What is more, the excess use of decree laws has not only affected the 
failure to justify the assumption of qualifying competence, but it also concerns 
non-compliance with one of the material limits prescribed by article 86.1, which 
states that decree laws “[…] cannot affect […] the rights, duties and freedoms of 
citizens regulated in Title I […]”. This major issue was posed regarding another 
important reform stemming from the economic crisis, namely the one 
prescribed by Royal Decree Law 3/2012 dated 10 February 2012 on urgent 
measures to reform the job market.7 
In its reference ruling, CCR 111/1983 dated 2 December 1983, 
constitutional jurisprudence interpreted that “[…] the restrictive clause of article 
86.1 SC (‘they cannot affect…’) must be understood in that it neither reduces the 
decree law to nothing, as it is a regulatory instrument provided for in the 
Constitution, ‘which it is possible to use to respond to the changing prospects of 
today’s life’ (underpinning 5, Ruling dated 4 February 1983), nor permits decree 
laws to be used to regulate the general system of rights, duties and freedoms in 
Title I […]” (LU 8). 
According to this reference established by jurisprudential doctrine, the 
Council of Statutory Guarantees interpreted that “[…] the ‘general system’ of a 
right, duty or freedom is comparable to the establishment of its legal regime, 
that is, the system of rules regarding the competence, purpose, form or 
procedure that define the law, in addition to the rules referring to the limits and 
guarantees in exercising it, all of which are essential elements of law” (Opinion 
5/2012 dated 3 April 2012, LU 2). In this sense, the Council believed that the 
new regulation prescribed by the labour reform (article 12 sections 1 and 2, and 
article 14 sections 1, 3 and 6) introduced an entire series of modifications that 
affect the exercise of two social rights: labour rights (article 35.1 SC) and the 
right to collective bargaining (article 38.1 SC). Thus, this entailed a general 
regulation impeded by the aforementioned constitutional jurisprudence. 
Thus, with regard to labour rights, the changes were general inasmuch as 
Royal Decree Law 3/2012 stated that the matters on which management may 
agree to substantial changes in the working conditions include the “amount of 
the salary”, an aspect which is an essential part of the collective bargaining 
                                                 
7 Later, the labour law reform was subjected to regulation by formal law: Law 3/2012 dated 6 
July 2012 on urgent measures to reform the labour market, which was also the subject of the 
Council of Statutory Guarantees Opinion no. 10/2012 dated 22 August 2012. 
38     CSSR, 6 (2016)  Marc Carrillo 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
agreement (CCR 225/2001 dated 26 November 2001, LU 7). According to the 
Council: “[…] given that, furthermore, the business owner is the one who can 
agree to the modification without regard to the other party in the labour 
relation, in this case the royal decree law (RDL) also introduces a general 
regulation which affects the purpose of the right to collective bargaining” (LU 
2). 
Regarding the right to collective bargaining in RDL 3/2012, the Council 
also interpreted that it established a general regulation, given that it introduced 
new elements that brought about substantial changes in its content, such as: the 
establishment of the general rule of priority in favour of the company’s side of 
the agreement when collective bargaining agreements do exist (art. 14.3 of RDL 
3/2012); the introduction of the provision of administrative intervention 
through which, in the absence of agreement between the parties, the resolution 
of the dispute is attributed to the decision of an administrative body called the 
National Consultative Commission on Collective Bargaining Agreements, even if 
this only stems the unilateral will of one party, (art. 14, section 1, of RDL 
3/2012); and finally, the introduction of the rule on the limitation of the validity 
and efficacy of collective bargaining agreements once they have been appealed, 
that is, what is called the “ultra-activity” of these agreements (art 14.6 of RDL 
3/2012). 
 
4. The case of the labour reform and its effects on the labour rights 
and to collective bargaining 
4.1. On the labour rights 
According to its statement of motives, the reform of the labour market initiated 
by RDL 3/2012 was envisioned as a way to deal with the economic crisis given 
the “evidence [of the] unsustainability of the Spanish labour model”.8 It was also 
presented as an instrument to “guarantee both flexibility […] in the 
management of human resources” and “the security of employed workers”.9 
One of the most controversial content precepts has been section 3 of 
article 4 of RDL 3/2012 on indefinite work contracts to support entrepreneurs, 
which was included within chapter II on “fostering indefinite hiring and other 
measures to favour job creation”. The content was as follows: 
 
“The legal system of the contract and the rights and 
obligations derived therefrom shall generally be governed by the 
provisions contained in the recast text of the Law on the Statute of 
Workers approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1995 dated 24 
                                                 
8 “The economic crisis has revealed the unsustainability of the Spanish labour model. The 
problems of the job market, far from being short-term, are structural, affect the very 
underpinnings of our social-labour model, and require an in-depth reform, which continue to be 
called for by all the world and European economic institutions despite the regulatory changes 
undertaken in recent years […]”. 
9 “The proposed reform attempts to guarantee both the flexibility of business owners in 
managing their human resources and the security of the employed workers and adequate levels 
of social protection. This is a reform in which everyone wins, both companies and workers, and 
it strives to satisfy the legitimate interests of everyone more and better.” 
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March 1995, and the collective bargaining agreements for 
indefinite contracts, with the sole exception of the length of the 
trial period referred to in article 14 of the Statute of Workers, 
which shall be one year in all cases.” 
 
The Council of Statutory Guarantees issued the aforementioned 
interpretative Opinion 5/2012 (LU 5) deeming that this precept did not run 
counter to articles 35 and 14 of the Constitution, if it was interpreted in 
accordance with the terms expressed in legal underpinning 6.1 of the 
Constitution. Nonetheless, we should draw attention to the arguments cited in 
this regard, especially the warnings about the risks of unconstitutionality which 
could arise from the content of the precept. 
The reservations regarding the unconstitutionality of this precept 
formulated by the parliamentary groups which asked for the Council’s opinion 
were the following: 1) the extension of the trial period of contracts called for in 
article 14 of the Statute of Workers (SW) to one year may violate labour rights 
(art. 35 SC), “in that after one year it allows the contract not to be renewed 
without the need for indemnification, or equally, it allows workers to be 
dismissed gratuitously and without justified cause”; and 2) this new regulation, 
the Council claimed, may violate article 4 of ILO Convention 158 from 1982 on 
severing labour relationships, which requires a justified cause to sever the 
labour relationship. In short, the Council’s arguments were the following: 
• The constitutionally protected content on labour rights (art. 53 SC) is 
job stability (CCR 223/1992, LU 3), which prevents unfounded 
temporary contracts and particularly rejects the termination of 
contracts without just cause (CCR 125/1994, LU 3). 
• Article 35 SC guarantees workers legal status when the business 
owner seeks to terminate their job contract. This means that this 
termination must fulfil certain guarantees: the cause must be legally 
provided for by law; the decision to terminate the contract must be 
expressed in a pre-notice; if needed, the corresponding workers’ 
representatives must be consulted; and finally, it must be formalised 
in a written notification (art. 53.1 SW). If these requirements are not 
met, the business’s unilateral decision may have detrimental effects 
on labour rights. 
• The provisions of article 53.1 SW are in line with international law as 
part of the state’s internal legal system on labour matters (art. 96.1 
SC). Specifically, this refers to ILO Convention 158, whose content 
must be borne in mind regarding the provisions contained in article 
10.2 SC, so that the “in accordance” interpretation established by the 
constitutional precept consists, according to the constitutional 
jurisprudence in this area, in the fact that the rights that are 
applicable to the specific case “should not be interpreted in 
contradiction” with the norms of international law on human rights  
(CCR 113/1995, LU 7) (Saíz Arnáiz, 2008: 10). 
• According to the provisions of art. 3 in article 4 of RDL 3/2012, the 
trial period in indefinite job contracts to support entrepreneurs is 
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characterised by permitting the unilateral termination of the contract 
during that period without any cause being cited and with no 
indemnification for the worker, nor is any given formalisation 
required to terminate the contract. Therefore, the reasons why the 
contract can be terminated during the trial period are not susceptible 
to judicial control except in the cases which entail a discriminatory act 
banned by article 17 SW. 
• The trial period according to ordinary jurisprudence on social matters 
consists in “[…] on-the-ground experimentation of the labour 
relationship through the execution of the respective roles of the 
parties, and its manifest function is to check the professional aptitude 
and adaptation to the job […], with these functions being more 
significant in qualified and managerial jobs than in other less 
qualified jobs. It consubstantially has a temporary, provisional nature, 
hence it is reasonable for its duration to generally be brief” (SCR 
dated 20 July 2011, Chamber for Social Matters, LU 2). 
• The length of the trial period established by RDL 3/2012 is “one year 
in all cases”, with no provisions for shorter lengths. We should add 
that the statement of motives cites no motivation behind such a length 
which reflects a legitimate purpose. Likewise, the one-year trial period 
is applied indistinctly to any kind of job, regardless of whether or not 
it is qualified, which could lead to discriminatory treatment since the 
regulation does not distinguish between different situations. The 
consequence of this regulation could be a denaturation of the trial 
period.10 
• Despite this, the Council ultimately determined that the 
interpretation of this regulatory provision on the length of the trial 
period could not be limited to its strictly literal reading but instead it 
had to be placed in systematic relationship with the entire content of 
article 4 of RDL 3/2012. In this sense, the kind of labour contract 
introduces an entire series of measures on fiscal incentives (section 4) 
                                                 
10 Regarding the length of the trial period, we should underscore the jurisprudence of the 
European Social Rights Committee of the Council of Europe, whose decision dated 23 May 2012 
on the grievance filed against Greece by two unions from this country, the General Federation of 
Employees of Public Electrical Companies (GENOP-DEI) and the Confederation of Unions of 
Public Employees (ADEDY), interpreted that the one-year trial period runs counter to the 
European Social Charter of 1961. It specifically refers to Greek Law 3899 dated 17 December 
2010, whose article 17.5 stipulates that during the trial period, an indefinite contract can be 
terminated without forewarning or indemnification for dismissal. The unions claimed that this 
precept violated article 4.4 of the Human Rights Charter of 1961. The Council’s decision on this 
matter was the following: “25. i) le droit à un délai de préavis raisonnable en cas de cessation 
d’emploi s’applique à toutes les catégories de salariés indépendamment de leur qualité, y 
compris à ceux qui se trouvent dans une relation de travail atypique. Il vaut également en 
période d'essai. La législation nationale doit être d'une portée telle qu’aucun travailleur ne soit 
laissé sans protection” [...] [...] “27. [...] l’article 17.5 de la Loi 3899 du 17 décembre 2010 ne 
prévoit pas de délais de préavis ni d’indemnité de licenciement dans les cas d’interruption d’un 
contrat de travail qualifié par elle de ‘à durée indéterminée’ pendant une période probatoire 
qu’elle étend à un an.” “28. Par conséquent, quelle que soit la qualification qu’est susceptible de 
recevoir le contrat dont il s’agit, le Comité dit que l’article 17.5 de la Loi 3899 du 17 décembre 
2010 constitue une violation de l’article 4.4 de la Charte de 1961.” 
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and bonuses (section 5) targeted at business owners and workers, 
which can be considered to be aimed at avoiding this denaturation of 
the trial period because of the employer’s abusive or fraudulent use of 
the purpose of the regulation. Analysing it as a whole, and beyond the 
absence of guarantees detected, article 4 establishes a regulation that 
objectively tends to provide greater job stability. 
However, we should add that the Council’s clear mistrust of the 
regulation on indefinite labour contracts and support of entrepreneurs did not 
go unnoticed by the state lawmakers. Indeed, after the content of RDL 3/2012 
was enacted as a law, specifically section 3 in fine of article 4 of Law 3/2012 
dated 6 July 2012 on urgent measures to reform the labour market, they added 
a new clause clearly aimed at trying to prevent this kind of contracting from 
becoming, de facto, an instrument that companies can easily abuse by offering 
unlimited, repeated temporary contracts. The terms of the regulatory addition 
were the following: “A trial period cannot be established when the worker has 
previously performed the same functions in the company under any kind of 
contract”. 
 
4.2. On the right to collective bargaining 
Another precept of RDL 3/2012 which sparked particular controversy was 
section 1 of article 14, which rewrites section 3 of article 82 SW on the procedure 
regulating collective bargaining agreements. The last paragraph stipulates the 
following: 
 
“When the consultation period ends without an agreement 
and the parties have not subjected themselves to the 
aforementioned procedures [referring to the prior phases when 
there is agreement among the parties or mediation via the 
autonomous conflict-resolution systems] or they have not resolved 
the dispute, either of the parties may ask that the National 
Consultative Committee on Collective Bargaining Agreements 
resolve the dispute […]”. 
 
One of the features of unconstitutionality alleged by the plaintiffs is 
grounded upon the violation of the right to collective bargaining (art. 37.1 SC) 
because of the establishment of forcible arbitration, as well of the right of 
judicial protection (art. 24.1 SC) citing the same reason, the latter an aspect 
which we shall not discuss in light of the content of this article. The Council of 
Statutory Guarantees also weighed in on this issue in the above-cited Opinion 
5/2012 (LU 5). In summary, the crux of its opinion was the following: 
• The kind of intervention of an almost arbitral nature that the precept 
in question attributes to the aforementioned National Consultative 
Committee on Collective Bargaining Agreements (NCCCBA) is not 
unheard of in labour law: the labour conflict-solving procedures of the 
autonomous communities offer a constitutional dimension connected 
with the rights to collective bargaining (art. 37.1 SC), the right to join 
unions (art. 28.1 SC), the right to adopt collective conflict measures 
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(art. 37.2 SC) and the right to judicial protection (art. 24.1 SC). This 
constitutional dimension stems from the capacity of the arbitration 
decision to outweigh the judicial ruling. In this sense, constitutional 
jurisprudence has not hesitated to accept the full conformity of the 
arbitration with constitutional principles (CCR 175/1996, LU 4). 
• However, lawmakers establishing ex lege an obligatory administration 
intervention to solve conflicts over certain matters is an entirely 
different matter. The Constitutional Court has rejected the 
constitutionality of obligatory public arbitration as a procedure to 
resolve conflicts on changing working conditions (CCR 11/1981, LU 
24). 
• The controversial issue regarding section 1 of article 14 lies in the fact 
that the decision to turn to the arbitration of the NCCCBA can come 
from “either of the parties”, which means introducing a rule of 
unilaterality to solicit the intervention of that Committee. The new 
regulation entails a profound change in the legal system of collective 
bargaining, since it means establishing a rule which is not generally 
applicable from the collective bargaining agreement agreed to earlier. 
This non-application is reached via the sole desire expressed by one of 
the parties: in consequence, it breaks with the constitutional mandate 
that guarantees the binding force of collective bargaining agreements 
which obligate lawmakers (art. 371. SC). As labour doctrine has 
stressed (CRUZ VILLALÓN, 2012: 394), the new rule ignores the 
collective pacta sunt servanda which is based upon the free consent 
of the parties, which the recipients cannot alter unless they agree 
otherwise. 
• The new regulation does not guarantee the right to collective 
bargaining (art. 37.1 SC) because it violates the freedom of negotiation 
by establishing the rule of unilaterality in the regulatory phase leading 
to the NCCCBA’s intervention, violating the binding force of collective 
bargaining agreements. In this sense, we should bear in mind what 
constitutional jurisprudence has to say on this matter: 
 
“[…] the collective bargaining agreement’s subjection to the 
regulatory power of the state, which is constitutionally legitimate, 
neither implies nor permits the existence of administrative 
decisions that authorise the waiver or unique inapplicability of 
provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements, which 
would entail ignoring the binding efficacy not only of the collective 
bargaining agreement but also of the principles guaranteed in art. 
9.3 SC. 
“Consequently, an interpretation of art. 41.1 SW, which 
would allow the labour administration to authorise the business 
owner to make substantial changes in the working conditions 
provided for and regulated in a collective bargaining agreement in 
force, would run counter to art. 37.1 SC [...].” (CCR 92/1992, LU 4) 
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• In short, inasmuch as just one party can impose on the other a 
resolution from the administration (NCCCBA) which rules on the 
appropriateness of modifying the working conditions, this is 
admitting that the collective bargaining agreement can be modified 
administratively, which is why it violates the right to collective 
bargaining (art. 371. SC). 
Subsequently, Law 3/2012 dated 6 July 2012 on urgent measures to 
reform the labour market, in the part relevant for an analysis of the 
constitutionality of section 1 of article 14, which led to a recasting of section 3 of 
article 82 SW on the regulatory procedure of collective bargaining agreements, 
introduced no changes that would avoid the unconstitutionality expressed above 
by the Council of Statutory Guarantees in Ruling 5/2012 (LU 5). 
 
5. The right to housing and the measures to guarantee it 
The high levels private debt of families and companies generated by the 
economic crisis in Spain has particularly affected the availability of housing 
purchased through mortgages11 granted by the different banks. Many citizens’ 
inability to meet their mortgage payments as a result of the devastating effects 
of the crisis on employment has led to foreclosures and evictions from 
numerous flats due to lack of payment. The loss of housing has become a large-
scale social problem. 
Given a situation of social fragmentation which is sounding ever more 
alarms, some authorities have begun to take measures to dampen the 
destructive effects on the right to decent, adequate housing (art. 47 SC). Among 
these measures, the one that has sparked the most legal controversy prescribes 
the forcible rental of empty homes at the request of the public administration. 
The Regional Government of Andalusia has recently prescribed this through 
Decree Law 6/2013 dated 9 April 2013 on measures to ensure fulfilment of the 
social function of housing.12 We should also refer to another earlier provision 
which sparked notable social and legal controversy in its day, but back before 
the effects of the crisis were as striking in people’s everyday lives, namely Law 
8/2007 of the Parliament of Catalonia, dated 28 December 2007, on the right to 
housing.13 Its previous wording, until the approval of the House Plenary 
                                                 
11 The conditions under which these mortgages were signed were often abusive, a circumstance 
which has been noticed by the Luxembourg court in its important ruling on 13 March 2013, 
issued on the occasion of a preliminary ruling by Mercantile Court no. 3 of Barcelona with 
regard to certain precepts in Directive 93/13/EEC of the Council, dated 5 April 1993, on unfair 
clauses in contracts made with consumers. In its provisions, the CJEU ruling interpreted that: 
“Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be 
interpreted as meaning that it is opposed to a regulation of a member states, such as the 
controversial regulation in the main lawsuit, that at the same time, within the framework of the 
procedure of mortgage foreclosure, does not provide the possibility of formulating motives of 
opposition based on the unfair nature of a contractual clause which constitutes the foundation 
of the enforceable title, does not allow the judge to ascertain the declarative process to become 
competent to determine the unfair nature of this clause, to adopt protective measures, 
including, in particular, the suspension of the procedure of mortgage foreclosure, when agreeing 
to such measures is necessary to guarantee the full efficacy of its final decision.”  
12 Official Gazette of the Regional Government of Andalusia (BOJA) no. 69, dated 11 April 2013. 
13 Official Gazette of the Government of Catalonia (DOGC) no. 5044, dated 9 January 2008. 
44     CSSR, 6 (2016)  Marc Carrillo 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Session, had called for measures similar to the ones that the Andalusian 
government has now taken urgently.14 The issue of constitutional relevancy 
sparked by the case is the determination of whether this administrative measure 
may violate the right to housing (art. 33 SC). 
In its statement of motives, Decree Law 6/2013 issued by the Regional 
Government of Andalusia dated 9 April 2013 introduces a definition of the 
social function of the right to housing which, in fact, is the same as the one used 
by constitutional jurisprudence, but to define the right of property:15 “The social 
function of housing shapes the essential content of law through the possibility of 
imposing positive duties on owners which ensure its effective use for residential 
purposes, with the understanding that this essential content cannot be 
established based on the exclusively subjective consideration of law or 
individual interests. The social function of housing, in short, is not an external 
limit to its definition or exercise but an integral part of the law itself.” It then 
adds that: “therefore, individual utility and social function are inseparable parts 
of the content of the right of property”. After describing the housing situation in 
Andalusia,16 the decree law concludes that there is “[…] an outrageously large 
housing stock that is unused or underused, while at the same time an unmet 
demand, with not enough housing on the market and inadequate prices, 
rendering it necessary to promote their use […].” 
With this purpose in mind, the content of the decree law stipulates an 
entire compendium of action initiatives on unoccupied housing which consist of 
promotional measures. Likewise, on a different front, this time through coercive 
and sanctioning measures, it also suggests fostering access to housing through 
rentals, the latter primary targeted at people who cannot maintain their home 
                                                 
14 In its first five sections, article 42 of the Draft Law on the Right to Housing (“Actions to avoid 
the permanent vacancy of housing”) calls for an entire series of promotional measures aimed at 
avoiding the proliferation of empty homes. Once these measures were exhausted, section 6 
stipulates that in areas where there is a proven strong demand for residency, the administration 
with authority on the matter may agree to the forcible rental of the home, having previously 
declared the owner’s failure to fulfil the social function. In line with this, if two years have 
elapsed since notification of the declaration of the home and it still remains empty, the 
administration may expropriate the use of the home under the terms stipulated by article 3.d of 
this draft law in order to rent it to third parties for a period that cannot exceed five years, after 
which the owner may resume use of their home. The draft law then states that the procedure to 
carry out this action must abide by the urban planning and forced expropriation laws, and in 
terms of fair price it must value the corresponding indemnification of the right to temporary use 
and defray the expenses taken on by the administration to manage and execute improvements in 
the home, if needed. The Generalitat’s Consultative Council handed down a majority opinion (4 
to 3 members) that section 6 of article 42 of the draft law ran counter to the Constitution 
because it generated legal insecurity in that “it is unlikely or very difficult to determine, 
rendering it difficult to apply…”, “the lack of determination of what is meant by ‘areas where 
there is a proven strong demand for residency’”, and “[…] it leads to discrimination among the 
owners of unoccupied homes in the same area qualified as having a ‘proven strong demand for 
residency’.” 
15 Constitutional Court Rulings 111/1983 and 37/1987.  
16 According to the figures provided in the Statement of Motives, the 2001 population and 
housing census that year showed there were 548,669 empty homes in Andalusia, which meant 
15.5% of the total housing stock and 22.7% of housing described as main residences. According 
to the latest figures published by the Ministry of Public Works, the housing stock in Andalusia is 
estimated at 4.5 million, which entails an increase of one million over the stock in 2001. 
Therefore, in ten years the housing stock has increased almost 25%. 
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because of a sudden increase in their debt. In this case, we should pay particular 
attention to the second additional provision on the “Declaration of social 
interest for the purposes of forced expropriation of the coverage of housing 
needs of people in special circumstances of social emergency”. 
The subjective and objective elements of this provision are the following: 
 
“1. The coverage of the housing needs of people in special 
circumstances of social emergency involved in eviction 
proceedings for foreclosure is declared to be of social interest for 
the purposes of forced expropriation of the use of the home being 
foreclosed for a maximum period of three years starting from the 
starting date agreed upon by the jurisdictional body with authority 
in this matter. 
“2. This decree law shall be applicable to homes involved in 
eviction proceedings initiated by banks, or their real estate 
subsidiaries or asset management entities, all without prejudice to 
the provisions contained in the basic state regulations.” 
 
Similar to the legal question posed by the Draft Law on the Right to 
Housing in Catalonia, in this case, too, there is the possible influence of the 
coercive measure of temporary forced expropriation over the property right of 
the owners of empty homes, which deserves our attention. 
Article 33 SC states that: “2. The social function of these rights shall 
delimit their content, in accordance with the laws”. It then adds that: “3. No one 
may be deprived of their assets or rights except for a justified cause of public 
utility or social interest through the corresponding indemnification and in 
accordance with the provisions of the laws”. 
In short, the jurisprudence on property law and the social function of 
housing is the following:17 
a) The SC’s conception of private property law reveals that the 
Constitution did not choose an abstract conception of this law. This cannot be 
conceived solely as a subjective sphere with free interpretation of the assets that 
are the object of the domain reserved by its owner, subjected solely to the 
general limitations that the law imposes to safeguard the legitimate rights and 
interests of third parties or the general interest. Instead, property law must also 
be recognised as a set of duties and obligations established in accordance with 
the law in line with the values and interests of the collective, and therefore in 
harmony with the purpose or social utility that each category of assets 
mentioned should serve. 
                                                 
17 CCR rulings 11/1983 dated 2 December 1983 and 166/1986 dated 19 December 1986, which 
respectively resolved the appeal and issue of unconstitutionality referred to in the expropriation 
of the Rumasa Holding. Likewise, CCF 37/1987 dated 26 March 1987 on a rural property matter 
(Andalusian Law 8.1984 dated 3 July 1984, on agrarian reform) which established a much more 
elaborate doctrine on the right to property and its social function. In the same vein are CCRs 
164/2001 dated 11 July 2001, 178/2004 dated 21 October 2004, and 112/2006 dated 5 April 
2006. 
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b) The SC does not limit property law to the merely civil conception, 
reduced to the margins of article 348 of the Civil Code which defines it as “the 
right to enjoy and have something without any other limitation than those 
established by law”. What can be gleaned from the supreme law is a conception 
of rights which are not solely susceptible to being limited; instead, their very 
limits are considered essential elements of their objective content. Therefore, 
the social function has not been understood by the framers of the Constitution 
as a simple external limit to the delimitation of the right to property but is also 
an integral part of it: individual utility and social function jointly define the 
essential content of the right to property in each category of assets. 
c) There is no infraction of the essential content when a legal regulation 
of the right to property restricts the owner’s ability to take decisions on the use, 
purpose or profit taken from the assets at stake, or when certain duties are 
imposed to strive for a more productive use of these assets, as long as their 
profitability can be guaranteed. 
d) The Constitutional Court has often used the hermeneutic criterion of 
the principle of proportionality (suitability, necessity and proportionality), 
especially in regard to the fundamental rights of freedom and participation of 
Section 1 of chapter II of title I of the SC.18 However, this hermeneutic criterion 
has evolved by incorporating a higher degree of objectivity in the evaluation of 
the proportionality of the measures taken by public powers, limiting them to the 
exercise of rights.19 In this interpretative line, the evolution of the criterion of 
proportionality has primarily affected the formalisation of its material 
dimension, and it has sketched the requirements needed so that the content of 
the action taken by a public power can be considered proportionate. The 
material expression of the judgement of proportionality has been defined via the 
need to verify the purpose of a measure by integrating the factual and temporal 
elements, or the simple ban on measures by public powers that do not meet 
these criteria.20 
The second additional provision of the Regional Government of 
Andalusia’s Decree Law 6/2013 dated 9 April 2013 is on depriving people who 
exercise the right to housing of their ownership. The regulatory measure taken 
is not a temporary limitation on the right to use the property applied in unique 
cases involving people who are in circumstances of social emergency as a result 
of an eviction process and after justifying an entire extremely detailed set of 
requirements that the potential beneficiary must meet (sections 3 to 15). The 
proportionality of the measure seems proven given that in a case of eviction, it 
may be impossible to find an alternative measure that could guarantee the 
availability of a home in any other way; its need is justified by the absence of a 
                                                 
18 Among others, Constitutional Court rulings 11/1981 dated 8 April 1981, 53/1985 dated 11 April 
1985, 209/1989 dated 15 December 1989, and 214/1994 dated 14 July 1994. 
19 Among others, Constitutional Court rulings 66/1995 dated 8 June 1995, 107/1996 dated 12 
June 1996, and 147/2001 dated 27 June 2001.  
20 This jurisprudence is in harmony with what was established by the ECHR in its leading 
property law case (ECHR ruling dated 23 September 1982; Sporrong and Lönnroth vs. 
Sweden); the Italian Constitutional Court in ruling no. 14 dated 7 March 1964; the Supreme 
Court of the United States 106 S. Ct. 1058, 1026 (1986) in the Connolly v. Pension Benefit Corp 
ruling; and the ruling by Court 1 of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany 
dated 1 March 1979. 
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physical space to live in; and its proportionality in the strict sense is endorsed 
because furthermore, what is temporally limited is the possession, not the 
ownership, in the context of a regional situation in which the stock of publicly 
subsidised homes is rising. 
 
6. Calculating vesting periods in part-time work contracts: The case 
of CCR 61/2013 dated 14 March 2013. The right not to be 
discriminated against in the exercise of labour rights 
In the new scene of labour relations that has developed over the past decade, 
part-time work contracts have become a usual feature in the job market 
landscape. This contractual formula has only become more prominent since the 
onset of the economic and financial crisis. The latest example is contained in 
article 5 (part-time contracts) of Law 3/2012 dated 6 July 2012 on urgent 
measures to reform the labour market.21 It once again calls for the possibility 
that workers associated with a company via a part-time contract can work 
overtime and that these overtime hours can be calculated as part of the Social 
Security contribution base and the bases regulating job benefits. 
However, with regard to part-time hiring and the system of calculating 
the vesting periods in part-time contracts when there is a request to receive a 
contributory pension, we should pay attention to the position adopted by the 
Constitutional Court, whose CCR 61/2013 dated 14 March 2013 declared 
unconstitutional the method of calculation established by the General Law on 
Social Security, recast text approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1994 dated 
20 June 1994 in the wording that appears in Royal Decree Law 15/1998 dated 
27 November 1998. 
From the standpoint of the guarantee of fundamental social rights, this 
decision is important because it discourages the use of part-time hiring, for 
which there are already enough incentives during this long crisis, to avoid 
situations that are discriminatory towards the worker. 
The ruling originated in the issue of unconstitutionality posed by the 
Social Court of the Higher Court of Justice of Galicia on the initial section of the 
second letter of section 1 of the seventh additional provision of the General Law 
on Social Security (GLSS), the recast text approved by Royal Legislative Decree 
1/1994 dated 20 June 1994, because it may violate article 14 SC. 
We should recall that this method of calculation was already questioned 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), when it handed down a 
ruling in which it deemed that the way Spanish law treated part-time workers 
was discriminatory.22 The CC has accepted the criterion established by the 
Luxembourg court in its underpinnings. 
                                                 
21 This precept modifies letter c) of section 4 of article 12 of the recast text of the Law on the 
Statute of Workers approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/1995 dated 24 March 1995. 
22 Section 38 of the CJEU ruling dated 22 November 2012 concluded that: “article 4 of Directive 
79/7 should be interpreted in the sense that in circumstances like the those in the main case, it 
opposes a member state regulation that requires part-time workers, the vast majority of them 
women compared to full-time workers, a proportionally higher contribution period to access, if 
desired, a contributory retirement pension in a proportionally lower amount than the partiality 
of their workday.” 
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Broadly speaking, the background was the following: a woman had 
proven 18 years of vesting, 11 of which were part-time, but that was not enough 
to meet the requirements. In order to determine the vested period needed to 
earn the right to benefits like retirement, permanent disability, death and 
survival, temporary disability, maternity and paternity, the norm stipulated that 
only payments made according to hours worked – either ordinary or extra – 
would be calculated, and their equivalency would be calculated in “theoretical 
days paid in”. With this purpose, the law states that the number of hours 
actually worked should be divided by five, which is equivalent to the daily 
calculation of 1,826 hours per year. What is more, to have the right to a pension 
for retirement and permanent disability, a multiplying coefficient of 1.5 should 
be applied to the number of theoretical days paid into the system. What results 
from this operation is the number of days which are regarded as accredited to 
determine the minimal vesting periods, although it is impossible to calculate 
more days paid in than what would result if the services had been provided full-
time (7th additional provision to the GLSS). We should note that between 1994 
and 1998, the wording of this precept was different, and that in CCR 253/2004 
it nullifies the former regulation by interpreting that the way part-time and full-
time workers were treated was unequal.23 
Even though based on this ruling the wording changed and corrections 
were introduced into the calculation rules, this did not prevent the issue of 
constitutionality from arising, which gave rise to CCR 61/2013. In summary, the 
arguments were the following: 
a) The GLSS continues to treat full-time and part-time workers 
differently in its calculation of vesting periods, which is not justified by the 
contributory requirements of the pension system. Likewise, this decision cannot 
be viewed as a sphere subjected to the free determination of lawmakers either, 
as sustained by the State Counsel’s Office. First of all, in relation to the doubt as 
to the issue of unconstitutionality via the possible existence of indirect 
discrimination on the basis of sex, the Court stated that the relative assessment 
of whether the precept questioned was justified and proportionate is a 
determining criterion in the solution to be adopted. 
Accordingly, recall that as a formally neutral or non-discriminatory 
treatment with regard to which, in reality, different factual conditions between 
workers of both sexes can be detected (CCR 240/1999, LU 6 and CCR 3/2007 
LU 3), indirect discrimination is applicable to the case of part-time workers. 
Regarding the particular case that raised the question, the ruling recognises that 
the provision is formally neutral but that, in an exercise of empirical 
                                                 
23 “[…] what does not appear justified is that a differential treatment is established between full-
time and part-time workers in terms of fulfilment of the required vesting period to access 
contributory social security benefits, a distinction which is therefore arbitrary and furthermore 
leads to a disproportionate result, since it hinders access to the protection of social security by 
workers hired part-time, a situation which predominantly affects working women, as revealed 
by the statistical figures. Therefore, from this perspective as well we must conclude that the 
second paragraph of art. 12.4 Law on the Statute of Workers, in the wording that appears in 
Royal Legislative Decree 1/1995 dated 24 March 1995, violates art. 14 SC as it leads to indirect 
discrimination because of sex.” (CCR 253/2004, LU 8) 
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jurisprudence, it states that based on the statistical data we can conclude that 
part-time contracts are an institution that primarily affects women.24 
b) Based on this, the Court rejects the fact that the criterion of 
proportionality should serve as the sole criterion for determining the retirement 
pension received according to the number of hours worked: 
 
“[…] when part-time work is not a more or less exceptional 
episode in the employee’s working life and when the usual 
workday is not very long, the application of the criterion of 
proportionality shall continue to be a disproportionate obstacle for 
their access to the retirement pension, despite the corrective rule”. 
(CCR 61/2013 LU 6) 
 
c) Likewise, the application of the corrective coefficient for the criterion 
of proportionality established in the reform of the GLSS after 1998 does not 
prevent cases like the one affecting the woman in the lawsuit from happening, 
because: 
 
“[…] just as we already stated in CCR 253/2004 dated 22 
December, ‘this hinders the very access to the benefit by requiring 
a higher number of days worked to accredit the vesting period 
stipulated in each case, which is particularly burdensome or 
excessive in the case of workers with extensive periods of part-time 
contracts in their working lives and in relation to the benefits that 
require long contribution periods” (CCR 61/2013 LU 6) 
 
7. In conclusion 
The economic crisis has had particularly severe effects in the states within the 
Eurozone, and it has had detrimental effects on the integrity of individuals’ 
social rights. Among other measures taken, the constitutional response to deal 
with it, which consists of incorporating the principle of budgetary stability into 
the supreme law, nonetheless has a rather relative juridical value because this 
principle was already contained in the European treaties. What is more, its pre-
eminence over the national legal systems made it possible to avoid a 
constitutional reform which, particularly in Spain, has reflected more 
circumstances of political opportunity towards European authorities than 
criteria of a legal order. In any event, in the incorporation of what is called the 
golden rule on budgetary stability contains the seed of a labour law which 
restricts social rights and has at times violated the Constitution. 
Indeed, the reform of the labour law approved in Spain to combat the 
effects of the crisis, grounded upon a single economic policy option based 
exclusively on lowering deficits and public debt, has translated it to the 
regulation of labour contracts and, more broadly, to the system of labour 
                                                 
24 It cites figures from 2002 from the National Statistical Institute which counted 198,100 
salaried part-time men and 879,200 women in the same labour situation. 
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relations, a concept based on the bilateral relationship between business owners 
and workers. This relationship is grounded upon the supposedly autonomous 
will of the parties as individual subjects, apart from the dimension of collective 
interests which is also involved. In this way, the right to collective bargaining 
articulated via collective bargaining agreements has been subjected to a specific 
regulation which actually revives the appearance of public arbitration 
obstructed by constitutional jurisprudence at the request – in fact – of business 
owners as the preeminent parties in labour relationships, such that it 
neutralises the labour functionality of the right contained in article 37.1 SC. 
A similar effect has taken place regarding labour rights in what the 
constitutional jurisprudence has interpreted as a defining feature of their 
content, namely the ban on unjustified dismissal, even though the latest 
legislation from the General Courts in this regard has managed to mitigate some 
of the more corrosive effects that the government’s urgent legislation had 
approved. 
Another consequence of the crisis affects the legal form of the measures 
taken to deal with it. In this respect, the regulatory instrument of the decree law 
has particularly come to the fore and has been used abusively by both the 
government of the state and the governments of different autonomous 
communities, breaking with the exceptional nature that theoretically 
characterises this source of law. The effect has been particularly detrimental to 
guaranteeing the division of powers as one of the essential principles of the rule 
of law, such that it is not too bold to state that parliamentary debate in the 
Congress of Deputies and – no doubt – in the parliaments of the autonomous 
communities on measures to counter the crisis have been glaringly missing. 
Finally, the economic crisis has also revealed the existence of measures 
aimed at preserving one of individuals’ most prized assets, housing, which is 
threatened by foreclosures caused by unpaid mortgages as a result of the 
unbridled growth in private debt. In this sense, the provisions approved in the 
autonomous communities aimed at promoting and at times forcing owners to 
rent homes for social use do not entail a limitation of the right to property that 
was impeded by the Constitution but an expression of their social function. 
 
Bibliography 
BASSOLS COMA, M. (2012). “La reforma del artículo 135 de la Constitución 
Española y la constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria: el proceso 
parlamentario de elaboración de la reforma constitucional”, in Revista 
Española de Derecho Administrativo, 155, pp. 21-41.  
CRUZ VILLALÓN, J. (2012). “Procedimientos de resolución de conflictos y 
negociación colectiva en la reforma de 2012”, in GARCÍA-PERROTE, I.; 
MERCADER, J. Reforma Laboral 2012. Valladolid: Lex Nova.  
EMBID IRUJO, A. (2012). La constitucionalización de la crisis económica. 
Madrid: Iustel.  
FERRERES COMELLA, V. (2012). “La crisis del euro y la regla de oro: 
problemas constitucionales”, in Actualidad Jurídica Uría Menéndez, Extra 1, 
pp. 96-103.  
The impact of the crisis on social rights  CSSR, 6 (2016)      51 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MEDINA GUERRERO, M. (2012). “La reforma del artículo 135 CE”, in Teoría y 
Realidad Constitucional, 29, pp. 131-164.  
MONCHÓN RUIZ, L. (2012). “La reforma del artículo 135 de la Constitución 
española y la subordinación de la deuda pública a la estabilidad presupuestaria 
y sostenibilidad financera”, in Revista Española de Derecho Financiero, 155, 
pp. 99-137.  
RUBIO LLORENTE, F. (2011). “Constituciones, naciones e integración 
europea”, in Claves de Razón Práctica, 217, pp. 4-8.  
RUIZ ALMENDRAL, V. (2009). “La reforma constitucional a la luz de la 
estabilidad presupuestaria”, in Cuadernos de Derecho Público, 38, pp. 89-159. 
RUIZ-HUERTA, J. (2012). “Algunas consideraciones sobre la reforma del art. 
135 de la Constitución espanyola”, in ÁLVAREZ CONDE, E.; SOUTO GALVÁN, 
C. (dir.). La constitucionalización de la estabilidad presupuestaria. Madrid: 
Instituto de Derecho Público.  
SÁIZ ARNÁIZ, A. (2009). “Artículo 10.2: La interpretación de los derechos 
fundamentales y los Tratados Internacionales sobre Derechos Humanos”, in 
CASAS BAAMONDE, M.E.; RODRÍGUEZ-PIÑERO, M. Comentarios a la 
Constitución Española: XXX Aniversario. Madrid: Fundación Wolters Kluwer.  
SANTOLAYA MACHETTI, P. (1988). El régimen constitucional de los decretos-
leyes. Madrid: Tecnos.  
SCHELKLE, W. (2007). “EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of 
Soft Law”, in Columbia Journal of European Law, 13. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52     CSSR, 6 (2016)  Marc Carrillo 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
